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“THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT ACTIONS”: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF QUI TAM 





In the fiscal year 2017, the DOJ of Justice (“DOJ”) recovered $3.7 billion in settlements and 
judgments from civil cases involving fraud under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).1 Of the $3.7 
billion obtained, $3.4 billion was recovered in claims filed under the qui tam provision of the Act.2 
The qui tam provision authorizes private individuals (“relators”) to bring claims of fraud on behalf 
of the United States. In the fiscal year 2017, the United States paid out $392 million to relators.3  
While the qui tam mechanism provides an effective method for combatting corporate fraud on 
the government, it inevitably inundates the DOJ with meritless claims arising from opportunistic, 
disgruntled employees.4 The public benefit of having a relator bring a claim against a corporation 
is undeniable: a private party with access to corporate records and executives can gather evidence 
within the corporation virtually undetected, providing the United States with a roadmap to make 
the case.5 However, the increasingly large sums at stake coupled with the inherent conflict of 
interest has given rise to a growing qui tam plaintiffs’ bar.6 The implications of an industrialized 
                                                     
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False 
Claims Acts Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-
cases-fiscal-year-2017. 
2 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Acts 
Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 1. 
3 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Acts 
Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 1. 
4 David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement Pathways: Lessons From Qui Tam Litigation, 
114 Colum. L. Rev. 1913, 1916-1917 (2014). 
5 John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 367, 
370 (2011). 
6 Ashcroft et al., supra note 5, at 371-372. 
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motivation for bringing qui tam claims may undermine the goals of relator litigation. While 
valuable, relator litigation seems to systematically contradict the FCA’s objective of protecting the 
public fisc. Given the scope of the statute, the discretionary considerations required to intervene 
in a case, and the incentivizes involved in the very nature of qui tam claims, the United States 
should have an absolute right to veto proposed FCA settlements attendant by dismissal between a 
relator and a private party because: (1)  Under §3730(b)(1), the Attorney General must consent to 
the dismissal of all qui tam actions; (2) the relator’s right to conduct the action includes the right 
to negotiate a settlement, but it does not exclude the government’s right to unilaterally oppose that 
settlement; and (3) the FCA is intended to recoup and return government money fraudulently taken 
by private parties, therefore the United States is the party suffering injury and should have control 
over the litigation. 
This article addresses the seemingly broad right granted to relators through the FCA and the 
government’s power to unilaterally supersede that right. §3730(b)(4)(B) states that when the 
United States notifies the court that it will not proceed with the action, “the person bringing the 
action shall have the right to conduct the action.” It should be noted that §3730(b)(4)(A) states that 
when the United States elects to proceed with the action “the action shall be conducted by the 
Government”.  
The scope of a conducted action is unclear. Under §3730(b)(4)(A), actions conducted by the 
United States seem to grant a unilateral and unfettered ability to control every aspect of litigation, 
including settlement and subsequent dismissal through the court. However, the relatively limited 
scope of a relator’s conduct may indicate that the “right to conduct the action” for a relator is more 
narrow than it is for the United States. Does a relator have the right to negotiate and execute a 
settlement agreement without government input? Does the right to conduct an action explicitly 
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require the ability to negotiate and carry out a settlement in court? Or does the provision in 
§3730(b)(1) requiring the Attorney General’s written consent to dismiss an action limit the relator 
to negotiating a settlement pursuant to the Attorney General’s consent? 
This article narrows the scope of relator action as permitted by the statute. Part I defines the 
FCA by examining its original text and subsequent amendments intended to both widen and limit 
the scope of relator conduct. It explores the government’s potential course of action when faced 
with a relator claim filed under seal and what limitations the United States encounters when 
engaging in specific actions. Part II outlines the plain and unambiguous language of the Act, 
specifically addressing the §3730(b)(1) “consent-for-dismissal” provision. Part III evaluates the 
significance of legislative intent and the role Congress envisioned for both relators and the United 
States in qui tam litigation. Part IV addresses the policies implicated in relator actions, including 
the benefits of allowing motivated relators to bring FCA suits and how these benefits weigh against 
the public interest at stake in qui tam litigation.  
I. DEFINING 31 USCS § 3730 
31 USCS § 3730, known as the False Claims Act, holds liable any person who “knowingly 
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim” for payment from the government.7 The FCA was originally enacted in 1863 to 
protect the United States against frauds committed by private contractors.8 Specifically, it was 
intended to protect government funds and property from fraudulent claims and bills for shoddy 
goods and services provided during the war effort. 9 
                                                     
7 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
8 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943). 
9 United States v. Silver, 384 F. Supp. 617, 619-620 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).  
  Callahan Spring AWR 
 
 5 
The FCA grants a relator the right to bring a civil action, called a qui tam action, 10  on behalf 
of the United States for a violation of the FCA. The loss is experienced by the United States, and 
the relator acts as a private attorney general to adjudicate the action on the government’s behalf.11 
Whatever the relator and her attorney recovers is analogous to an attorney’s contingency fee, while 
the rest of the damages are returned to the government to compensate for the injustice.12 The 
United States, not the relator, is the party in interest suffering the requisite “injury in fact” to satisfy 
Article III standing.13 
When the United States elects to intervene, the FCA’s qui tam mechanism entitles relators to 
damages of fifteen to twenty five percent of any recovery.14 When the relator conducts the action 
independently, she can recover up to thirty percent of any recovery.15 Upon successful prosecution, 
the relator can also recover attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in addition to the sum recovered 
from defendants.16 When a relator is involved, the maximum recovery for the public fisc is only 
85% of the sum recovered from defendants. 
The FCA provides the United States with the discretion to proceed with claims of fraud brought 
by relators. The statute states that the private person must serve the United States a copy of the 
complaint disclosing substantially all material evidence the person possesses, pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 4(d)(4).17 As originally enacted, the United States had no right to take over an action.18 All 
                                                     
10 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). 
11 United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 961 F.2d 46, 
49 (4th Cir. 1992). 
12 United States ex rel. Milam, 961 F.2d at 49. 
13 ex rel. Milam, 961 F.2d at 49. 
14 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
15 Id. at § 3730(d)(2). 
16 John Ashcroft et al., supra note 5, at 370. 
17 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
18 United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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actions were brought by a relator.19 In 1943, the FCA was amended to accommodate for a 60-day 
period during which the United States could decide whether it wants to pursue the claim.20 In 1986, 
the FCA was amended once again to allow the United States to extend the 60-day period upon a 
showing of good cause, pursuant to an in camera review by the court.21 The complaint is filed 
under seal for a 60-day period, during which the United States may determine how to proceed with 
the action.22 The government may elect to extend the 60-day period upon a showing of good 
cause.23 
Once the United States is served with a relator claim filed under seal, it can proceed in three 
ways: (1) the government may dismiss the claim provided the relator is given the opportunity for 
a hearing on the motion;24 (2) the government may intervene with the action and continue with the 
litigation independently;25 or (3) the government may notify the court that it does not wish to 
proceed with the action and the relator has the “right to conduct the action”.26 
While the United States may seek dismissal of relators’ claims under §3730(c)(2)(A), the FCA 
does not provide a standard to determine whether to request a dismissal.27 The DOJ released a 
memorandum in January 2018 addressing discretionary dismissals of meritless qui tam claims.28 
The Granston Memo acknowledges that there has been a dramatic increase in meritless claims 
                                                     
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 31 USCS § 3730(b)(3). 
22 Id. at § 3730(b)(2). 
23 Id. at § 3730(b)(3). 
24 Id. at § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
25 Id. at § 3730(b)(4)(A). 
26 Id. at § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
27 DOJ Memorandum, Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), at 
3, available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4358602/Memo-for-Evaluating-
Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf. 
28 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 1. 
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filed under the FCA. The Memo establishes a “general framework for evaluating when to seek 
dismissal”,29 outlining factors for the United States to consider when determining whether to seek 
dismissal of a qui tam claim.  
The first factor aims to “curb meritless claims” by dismissing claims relying on defective legal 
theories or where relator’s factual allegations are frivolous.30 Second, the DOJ intends to prevent 
“parasitic or opportunistic qui tam claims” by identifying claims brought by relators seeking an 
“unwarranted windfall” from the action.31 Third, the DOJ seeks to dismiss claims in an effort to 
prevent “interference with agency policies and programs”, where a qui tam action contradicts an 
agencies policies.32 Fourth, to protect the government’s gatekeeping role to litigation brought on 
its behalf, the DOJ asserts that it should seek dismissal when necessary to control litigation on 
behalf of the United States.33 Fifth, in cases involving intelligence agencies or military contracts, 
the DOJ may dismiss a claim to “safeguard classified information and national security 
interests”.34 Sixth, the DOJ recommends seeking dismissal when “the government’s expected costs 
are likely to exceed any expected gain.”35 Finally, the DOJ seeks to dismiss a claim when the 
relator committed “egregious procedural errors” prior to serving the United States with the 
complaint.36  
The United States, which includes the DOJ, the U.S. Attorneys Office, and any agencies 
responsible for reimbursing claims from the public fisc, such as the DOJ of Health and Human 
                                                     
29 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 1. 
30 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 3. 
31 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 4. 
32 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 4-5. 
33 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 5. 
34 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 6. 
35 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 6. 
36 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 7. 
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Services, the DOJ of Defense, and the Veterans Administration consult to determine whether to 
intervene in the qui tam action.37 The United States conducts a preliminary investigation to 
determine whether intervention is necessary.38 The United States typically intervenes “in cases 
that are high-profile, in cases that are novel, and in cases that involve the prospect of significant 
recovery”.39 Data collected by Professor David Freeman Engstrom indicates that the United States 
is more likely to intervene in cases brought by relators represented by “more sophisticated, repeat 
plaintiffs’ counsel”.40 
After its investigation, the United States, represented by the Attorney General, may decide to 
intervene in actions brought by relators. The scope of this intervention right is defined in 
§3730(b)(2), which states “the Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action 
within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.” 
Once the United States intervenes, no party other than the government has the right to intervene 
or bring a related action.41 The government’s intervention before the conclusion of the 60-day 
period or any extensions allows it to proceed with the action.42 The limits on the intervention clause 
are unclear because the United States can request extensions on the 60-day timeline for good 
cause.43 
                                                     
37 Kathleen M. Boozang et al., The Ctr. For Health & Pharm. Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law, The 
False Claims Act and the Policing of Promotional Claims About Drugs: A Call for Increased 
Transparency 3 (2015). 
38 Boozang et al., supra note 37, at 3. 
39 Boozang et al., supra note 37, at 46. 
40 David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of 
DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1689, 1696 
(2013). 
41 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
42 Id. at § 3730(b)(4)(A). 
43 Id. at § 3730(b)(3). 
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The United States has often been unwilling to intervene in qui tam claims.44 As noted by the 
DOJ in the Granston Memo, while many qui tam claims reveal significant frauds against the 
government, a great volume of relator claims do not warrant the resources required to adequately 
investigate.45 Because a relator’s financial incentive is considerable, many claims brought by 
relators result in fruitless investigation and are decidedly meritless.46 The United States will often 
decline to intervene in a case because the evidence provided by a relator is not substantive enough 
to warrant intervention until the government has the opportunity to see how the claim fares in 
court.47 Thus, the United States retains the right to intervene at later date, upon a showing of good 
cause.48  
In the Granston Memo, the DOJ asserts that it has an “unfettered discretion” to dismiss 
claims.49 This “unfettered discretion” is derived from §3730(b)(1), which provides a further 
obstacle to settling a case on the relator’s terms: “The action may be dismissed only if the court 
and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.” 
This unfettered discretion becomes critically important at later stages in litigation. The question 
remains whether the Attorney General can force the relator and defendant to continue litigating by 
withholding consent for dismissal when the proposed settlement is deemed unsatisfactory by the 
United States. 
 
                                                     
44 Peter Leininger, A New Weapon To Help FDA Control Enforcement Priorities, February 21, 
2018, available at https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/005/669/original/2-21-
18_Law360.pdf?1519248226. 
45 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 3. 
46 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 3. 
47 Boozang et al., supra note 37, at 49. 
48 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). 
49 Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 7. 
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II. THE CONSENT-FOR-DISMISSAL PROVISION 
Under §3730(b)(1) of the FCA, qui tam actions “may be dismissed only if the court and the 
Attorney General give written consent for the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.” Some 
circuits suggest that the language of §3730(b)(1) is narrowed by its context; other provisions under 
the statute indicate limitations on the Attorney General’s control. When reading the §3730(b)(1) 
consent-for-dismissal provision, the 9th Circuit decided that the Attorney General’s consent is 
limited to dismissals made within the 60-day period for intervention.50 During the 60-day (or 
extended) period, the government retains the absolute right to bar a dismissal.51 The 9th Circuit 
said this absolute right to bar a dismissal does not extend past the 60-day period because, when 
read in conjunction with §3730(b)(2), the United States has the right to either “intervene” or 
“proceed with the action”.52 When the United States chooses not to intervene, it waives its right to 
proceed with the action.53  
In United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., the 9th Circuit held that the United 
States retains the right to object to a proposed settlement upon a showing of good cause, without 
having intervened earlier in the litigation, but it cannot block the settlement by withholding consent 
for dismissal. The case involved Killingsworth, a former employee of Northrop, who alleged as a 
relator that Northrop improperly inflated cost estimates supporting missile contract proposals, 
thereby violating the FCA.54 After investigating the claim for more than 18 months, pursuant to 
the requisite extension, the United States chose to not intervene.55 Killingsworth and Northrop 
                                                     
50 United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994). 
51 United States ex rel. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722. 
52 ex rel. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 718. 
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unsuccessfully attempted to settle multiple times due to government objections.56 Although the 
United States never intervened, it objected to the proposed settlement which it contended was 
structured to ensure that the majority of the money was allocated to the relator under his wrongful 
termination claim and attendant attorneys’ fees, rather than recovery to the government pursuant 
to the FCA claim.57 Killingsworth and Northrop eventually reached an agreement without the 
United States and moved to dismiss the claim, however the United States objected to the 
settlement, and despite having declined to exercise its right to intervene for good cause, elected to 
intervene for purposes of appeal.58 The lower court decided that the Attorney General’s consent to 
dismiss was not required and dismissed the claim.59  
In Part III of its decision, the 9th Circuit held that the §3730(b)(1) “consent-for-dismissal” 
provision must be read in conjunction with §3730(b)(2), which enumerates the temporal aspect of 
the government’s intervention rights.60 Therefore, consent by the Attorney General is only required 
to dismiss a claim during the 60-day period or when the United States has elected to intervene in 
the action.61 Thus, under the 9th Circuit’s interpretation, the consent-for-dismissal provision is 
temporally limited to the period during which the United States can elect to intervene. 
Many courts have challenged the 9th Circuit’s reading of the §3730(b)(1).62  The 4th, 5th, and 
6th Circuits have subsequently held that the consent-for-dismissal provision is not temporally 
                                                     
56 Id. at 719. 
57 Id. at 718. 
58 Id. 
59 United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 699 (9th Cir. Cal., 
Jan. 19, 1994). 
60 25 F.3d at 720-721. 
61 Id. 
62 See United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (rejecting argument that DOJ dismissal or settlement authority is conditional on prior 
intervention); Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 931 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Even where 
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qualified or explicitly limited in any other manner. The 5th Circuit explicitly rejected the 9th 
Circuit’s reading of the statute. The 5th Circuit held that the statutory language was unambiguous 
and that there is nothing in the FCA that negates or contradicts the plain meaning of the consent-
for-dismissal provision.63 In Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., Bortner, a division manager at 
Philips, alleged that Philips illegally concealed its decision to withdraw from the US market from 
the US government.64 The US government continued to buy and lease equipment from Philips 
without knowledge that Philips no longer operated in the US.65 The government objected without 
intervening.66 The lower court overruled the objection, executed the settlement, and dismissed the 
case, from which the United States appealed.67 
The 5th Circuit held that courts may not grant a voluntary dismissal in a FCA suit unless the 
U.S. Attorney General consents to the dismissal.68 Under the statutory construction, relators sue 
on behalf of both themselves and the government.69 The United States is the real party in interest 
even when it does not control the FCA claim.70 The Court rejected the legislative history argument 
from Killingsworth and found that in both of the amendments made to the FCA, Congress had 
expanded the government’s ability to take control of the litigation.71  
                                                     
the Government has declined to intervene, relators are required to obtain government approval 
prior to entering a settlement or voluntarily dismissing the action.") 
63 Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 159 (5th Cir. 1997). 
64 Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155. 
65 117 F.3d at 155.  
66 Id. at 158. 
67 Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 1:95-CV-363 (E. D. Tex. 1997), appeal docketed, 
No. 96-40515 (5th Cir. June 30, 1997). 
68 117 F.3d at 155. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 156. 
71 Id. at 159-60. 
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The Court held that the language of §3730(b)(1) is unambiguous.72 Despite each of the 
amendments to the FCA, Congress never changed the last sentence of §3730(b)(1) requiring the 
Attorney General’s consent to the dismissal of a qui tam action.73  Because Congress did not 
include language limiting the requisite consent, reading the statute plainly is sufficient to determine 
its intent.74 
The 6th Circuit similarly, and perhaps, more harshly, rejected the 9th Circuits interpretation of 
the consent-for-dismissal provision. In United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., the Doyles’, 
as relators, alleged that Health Possibilities illegally sought reimbursement for physician assistant 
services that were not “incident to” physician services as required for reimbursement by 
Medicare.75 Their complaint was later amended to include allegations that Health Possibilities had 
submitted false Medicare claims to the DOJ of Health and Human Services by fraudulently 
inflating their Medicare bills by using billing codes that signified services that were more 
expensive than the services actually provided, in violation of the FCA.76  
At the same time, an employee at Health Possibilities accused Dr. Doyle of sexual 
misconduct.77 Dr. Doyle subsequently sued Health Possibilities for defamation.78 The United 
States declined to intervene in the FCA action.79 The Doyles’ and Health Possibilities entered a 
settlement agreement without the United States, consolidating the FCA claim and the defamation 
suit.80 Under the proposed agreement, the United States did not receive any damages because the 
                                                     
72 Id. at 159. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 159. 
75 United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 337 (6th Cir. 2000). 
76 Health Possibilities, 207 F.3d at 337. 
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FCA suit was to be settled for attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief.81 The United States objected to 
the settlement on the grounds that the relator “essentially channeled damages payments to the 
defamation action” to avoid sharing the FCA settlement with the United States.82 The District 
Court held that §3730(b)(1) consent-for-dismissal was only required to dismiss claims prior to 
government's original intervention decision and that when the government affirmatively chooses 
not to intervene, the Relator can settle notwithstanding the government's opposition.83 The District 
Court further held that, by waiving its intervention right, the United States constructively consents 
to subsequent dismissal without its input.84 
The 6th Circuit held that the relator cannot seek a voluntary dismissal of a complaint without 
the Attorney General’s consent.85 The Court found that the plain language of 3730(b)(1) did not 
temporally limit the consent-for-dismissal provision to the 60-day intervention period.86 The Court 
unblinkingly rejected the 9th Circuit’s reading of the statute and found that “If Congress wanted 
to limit the consent requirement to the period before the United States makes its initial intervention 
decision, we presume that it knew the words to do so.”87 The original version of the FCA did not 
have a mechanism for government intervention, however it did contain the consent-for-dismissal 
provision.88 This suggests that the consent-for-dismissal provision was never intended to be limited 
by the intervention period. 
                                                     
81 Id. at 338. 
82 Id. 
83 United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., No. 96-00485 (E. D. Ky. 2000) appeal docketed, 
No. 99-5259 (6th Cir. 2000). 
84 Id. 
85 United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2000). 
86 207 F.3d at 339. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 340. 
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Most recently, the 4th Circuit used the 9th Circuit’s legislative context justification to prove 
the contrary: other provisions of the FCA use temporally-limiting language, but §3730(b)(1) does 
not.89 In United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., several former Agape 
employees alleged that Agape fraudulently billed Medicare and other federal health care programs 
for services to thousands of patients that were not actually provided or were provided to ineligible 
patients.90 The government declined to intervene but explicitly request that the relators and Agape 
solicit the Attorney General’s written consent before asking the court to rule on a proposed 
settlement, pursuant to §3730(b)(1).91 Because there were so many patients and claims involved 
in the case, the parties were relying upon statistical sampling of the claims to estimate damages; 
however, the United States and the parties disagreed over the methodology for such sampling, 
causing them, respectively, to arrive at significantly disparate estimates of the amount owed to the 
government.92 Interestingly, the District Court rejected statistical sampling at all.93  The relators, 
the United States, and Agape attempted to mediate but were ultimately unsuccessful.94 The relators 
eventually came to a settlement agreement with Agape.95 The United States objected to the 
proposed settlement because it had done its own statistical sampling during the course of its 
investigation and found that the damages would be at least $25 million, however the proposed 
settlement was appreciably less than such amount.96 Agape filed a motion to enforce the settlement 
                                                     
89 United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017). 
90 ex rel. Michaels, 848 F.3d at 333. 
91 848 F.3d at 334. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 335. 
96 Id. 
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without the Attorney General’s consent, but the District Court ruled that the United States 
possessed absolute veto authority over FCA settlements.97 
The 4th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the government possesses an 
unreviewable veto authority over the attempted dismissal of FCA claims.98 The Court found that 
§3730(b)(1) means exactly what it plainly says: The Attorney General’s written consent is required 
to dismiss an FCA claim.99 The consent-for-dismissal provision is not temporally qualified or 
limited in any way. The Court found that other provisions of the statute require the United States 
to satisfy a standard of reasonableness which served to limit the provision by requiring the court 
to review the government’s action.100 The court pointed to the language in §3730(c)(2)(B) that 
says when the government settles an action over a relator’s objection, the court must determine 
that “the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances” subject 
to a hearing.101 Because this language was readily available to Congress as a mechanism for 
limiting the Attorney General’s authority subject to judicial review and Congress chose not to use 
it in the consent-for-dismissal context, the 4th Circuit found that Congress did not intend to limit 
the Attorney General’s power of dismissal.102 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY CONTEXT DEFINING THE SCOPE OF 
RELATOR CONDUCT 
The purpose of the FCA is to protect the public from institutions that bring false claims and to 
protect government money. When the FCA was first enacted, Congress was responding to reports 
                                                     
97 United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty. Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 D.S.C., 
June 25, 2015). 
98 848 F.3d at 330. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 339. 
101 Id. at 340. 
102 Id. 
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that the United States was being billed for what the government believed to be valid contracts on 
wartime necessities, but was actually nonexistent goods and services.103 In response to this 
egregious fraud on the United States, Congress imposed both civil and criminal liability for such 
fraud.104 Since then, Congress has trebled the damages provision so that liability is “essentially 
punitive in nature.”105 This change indicates that Congress is primarily concerned with preventing 
fraud on the United States and is less concerned with compensating private parties affected by the 
fraud.  
The 9th Circuit has held that Congress intended to place full responsibility for FCA litigation 
on private parties.106 The Court came to this conclusion by attempting to discern Congress’ intent 
in the context of the legislation’s enactment and subsequent amendments. The Court held that the 
government's role in FCA actions pursued by relators has evolved since the legislation was enacted 
in 1863.107 Under the original statute the United States did not have the right to take over an action 
initiated by a relator. The government’s right to intervene was granted in 1943, when the Act was 
amended to give the United States the option to take over a relator’s claim during a 60-day period 
of contemplation.108 In 1986, the Act was further amended to give the government the option to 
extend the 60-day period upon a showing of good cause. The 9th Circuit examined the Senate 
Report accompanying the 1986 amendment to conclude that Congress intended to expand relators’ 
control over the litigation.109 The Senate Report stated that Congress’ intent was to “encourage 
                                                     
103 Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 U.S. 1989, 1996 (2016). 
104 ex rel. Escobar, 136 U.S. at 1996. 
105 Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 U.S. 1989 at 1996; quoting 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 756, 764 (2000). 
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more private enforcement” by increasing incentives for relators bringing FCA claims.110 The Court 
also noted that, according to the Senate Report, the government’s ability to extend the 60-day 
intervention period was intended to provide the government with the opportunity to intervene in 
“situations where new and significant evidence is found”.111 The Court held that the Senate Report 
indicated that, absent early intervention by the United States, Congress intended to place full 
responsibility for FCA litigation in private parties.112 It concluded that this intent would be 
fundamentally challenged by an absolute veto power.113 
The 5th Circuit, too, looked at the legislative history of the FCA and came to a significantly 
different conclusion. In its decision in Searcy, the Court acknowledged that when the FCA was 
originally enacted in 1863, the United States had no right to intervene in a false claims action.114 
However, since the legislation’s inception, Congress has both created the government’s power to 
intervene in a relator action, and has subsequently expanded this power to assume control of the 
litigation.115 While a number of changes have been made to the language and application of the 
Act, essentially resulting in an overhaul of its execution, Congress never eliminated the consent-
for-dismissal provision.116 The 5th Circuit did not credit the Senate Report to the extent that the 
Court did in Killingsworth, as the Senate Report, while persuasive, is not the law.  
The 9th Circuit stands alone in its interpretation of the legislative intent of the FCA.  The 6th 
Circuit perhaps said it best in its decision in Health Possibilities: “the FCA is not designed to serve 
the parochial interests of relators, but to vindicate civic interests in avoiding fraud against public 
                                                     
110 S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1986) 
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monies.”117 The Court found that the qui tam mechanism is not intended to compensate relators. 
Instead, it is a mechanism to promote accountability among the public to ensure deterrence of 
frauds on the government.118 The qui tam mechanism is an efficient and cost-effective way to make 
companies beholden to the system, as relators are individuals who have been wronged by a private 
actor and are incentivized to achieve justice.119 This broad principle is entirely consistent with 
securing the government’s ability to protect the public interest at stake. This suggests that Congress 
intended to grant the United States authority over privately negotiated settlements even when it 
does not intervene.120  
The “right to conduct an action” under § 3730(b)(4)(B) includes the right to negotiate a 
settlement, but it does not preclude the United States from objecting to that settlement. While 
determining the plain meaning of a statute requires a determination of legislative intent to some 
extent, courts ultimately rely on statutory context to determine where the right to conduct an action 
begins and ends. The relator’s right to conduct an action is derived from § 3730(b)(4)(B), which 
states that “[b]efore the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained under paragraph 
(3), the Government shall … notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case 
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action”, and § 3730(c)(3), which 
states that “[i]f the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person who initiated the 
action shall have the right to conduct the action.” One thing is clear: the legislation is intended to 
protect the public from institutions that bring false claims and to protect the public fisc. More 
generally, however, while some courts say that Congress intended to place full responsibility for 
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FCA litigation on the relators,121 others have found that the United States has control over the 
litigation. Because the legislation is intended to avoid fraud on the government and the United 
States is the real party in interest, the United States should retain control over claims brought under 
the FCA. 
The 9th Circuit held that the government does not have the right to block the settlement because 
the relator has the right to conduct the action on its own after the United States fails to intervene 
while the case is under seal.122 The Court decided that the amendments to the FCA indicated that 
Congress intended to place full responsibility for FCA litigation on private parties when the United 
States declines to intervene.123 According to the 9th Circuit, allowing the United States to have an 
“absolute” right to block a settlement contravenes this intent.124 
The 9th Circuit further held that § 3730(b)(4)(B) grants relators the right to conduct the action 
when the United States has elected not to intervene and that the right to conduct the action 
necessarily includes the right to negotiate a settlement.125 The Court held that the right to conduct 
an action obviously includes the right to negotiate a settlement according to § 3730(d)(2) because 
the person “bringing the action” or “settling the claim” must be the same person.126 Under this 
assumption, the relator is both the person “bringing the action” and the person “settling the claim”, 
and as that person satisfying those roles, the relator has conducted the action.  
In part IV of its decision, however, the Court held in the United States’ favor by finding that 
the government retains the right to object to a proposed settlement upon a showing of good cause, 
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123 ex rel. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722. 
124 25 F.3d at 720. 
125 Id. at 722. 
126 Id. at 721. 
  Callahan Spring AWR 
 
 21 
without having intervened earlier in the litigation.127 In the Court’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(c)(2)(B), it found that the United States cannot force a relator to continue litigation, but it 
can question a settlement upon a showing of good cause.128 The Court noted that 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(c)(3) grants the United States the right to intervene at a later date.129 It distinguished this 
intervention upon a showing of “good cause” from the government’s attempt to block the 
settlement as a limited intervention and determined that 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) did not apply.130 
However, the Court found that the same principal applies: upon a showing of good cause, the 
United States can object to the proposed settlement based on concerns fairness, adequacy, and 
reasonableness.131 In the same way that a relator can question a settlement requiring a review by 
the court, the 9th Circuit extended this interpretation of the “good cause” requirement to the 
government when objecting to a relator settlement.132 The case was remanded to the lower court 
for a determination of good cause.133 Interestingly, the District Court subsequently affirmed the 
settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.134 
The 9th Circuit’s analysis of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) fails to account for the requisite consent 
from the Attorney General to dismiss the claim. While the relator can, and often does, negotiate 
the settlement, the Attorney General must ultimately consent to the dismissal of the claim. The 9th 
Circuit wants “settling the claim” to include dismissing the claim, however, claims cannot be 
dismissed without the Attorney General’s consent, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). 
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The 4th and 5th Circuits have come to a similar conclusion. The 5th Circuit held that the 
relator’s right to conduct the action under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) does not necessarily include 
the right to negotiate a settlement in that action.135 The Court decided that “a relator has 
‘conducted’ an action if he devises strategy, executes discovery, and argues the case in court, even 
if the government frustrates his settlement efforts”.136 Under this understanding of the “right to 
conduct the action” clause, there is no conflict between the government’s right to veto voluntary 
settlements and the relator’s right to control the litigation.137 
In Agape, the Court held that, contrary to the decision in Killingsworth, 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(b)(4)(B) and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) do not create an unfettered right for the relator to settle 
an action.138 The Court relied on the 5th Circuit’s explanation of when an action is “conducted”, 
as explained in Searcy. Under this analysis of the statute, the right to conduct the action and the 
right to settle the claim are not mutually exclusive.139 In some cases, absent the Attorney General’s 
objection, the relator will have control over the settlement.140 However, an action has been 
conducted regardless of whether the United States decides to veto the settlement.141 
IV. POLICY 
The FCA includes a qui tam provision because the scope of fraud on the United States is much 
broader than the government’s ability to detect it.142 The qui tam provision allows the United States 
to detect fraud that it would not otherwise be able to discern. The system for submitting claims is 
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fairly removed from the government’s watchful eye, therefore the United States must rely on 
participants holding themselves accountable. Allowing relators to bring a claim on behalf of the 
government is the most cost-effective and efficient method to hold perpetrators accountable.143 
Relators hold perpetrators liable to private persons who are motivated by “ill will” or “personal 
gain”.144 Economic downturn and employee layoffs tend to create a class of relators willing to risk 
damaging their relationship with an employer, resulting an increase in qui tam filings.145 In fact, 
there is no requirement that the relator be personally harmed by the defendant’s conduct at all to 
gain a percentage of the recovery from a successful suit.146 The United States must retain control 
over the litigation because private interest and public good do not necessarily overlap, thus the 
government must focus the litigation on pursuing the public good.147 
When allowing a relator to bring claim on behalf of the United States, the United States is wary 
of relators’ attempting to unjustly enrich themselves, therefore reducing benefits to the public fisc. 
Any judgment entered for the relator has a preclusive effect on the United States, as the relator 
brings the claim on behalf of the United States.148 This res judicata concern is critical, as settling a 
claim with a relator becomes quite valuable for a defendant looking to avoid confrontation with 
the United States. This incentivizes the relator to “shift settlement proceeds away from FCA fraud 
claims, where a relator receives only a portion of the winnings under the FCA's bounty provisions, 
and toward the other claims, where recovery is dollar-for-dollar.”149 
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In Searcy, Bortner, had negotiated with Philips without the government’s input. The United 
States objected to the settlement on two grounds: (1) the Attorney General’s investigation, the 
conclusion of which suggested that the proposed settlement amount was too low; and (2) releasing 
the claim would preclude the United States from pursuing future claims arising out of issues that 
the United States had not yet had the opportunity to investigate.150 This preclusion would be 
valuable to Philips, a value that could potentially be leveraged by Bortner, and may have the result 
of increasing the settlement amount. Bortner had essentially boosted the value of the settlement by 
“bargaining away” claims on behalf of the United States.151 However, 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(1) 
provides protection against this by allowing the United States to refuse the settlement when it 
perceives the relator receiving an unjust enrichment from the agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The dangers of allowing a relator to bring an FCA action against a company without input 
from the United States are significant. Due to res judicata concerns, the United States must consent 
to a dismissal of a proposed settlement attendant to the dismissal of a qui tam claim between a 
relator and a defendant, even if the United States does not choose to intervene at an earlier stage 
of litigation. The FCA provides such a mechanism under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). It further narrows 
the scope of a relator’s conduct under 31 U.S.C. §§§ 3730(b)(4), 3730(c)(3), and 3730(d)(4). 
Therefore, the United States reserves an absolute veto power over settlements attendant to 
dismissal under the FCA. 
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